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The general  mission  of feminist  philosophy  is to correct 
whatever  male  biases  may  exist  in  the  mainstream 
philosophical  traditions . Thus  western  feminist 
philosophers  investigate  and challenge the ways in which 
western  traditions  have  so long  been  participating  in 
subordinating  women  or  in  rationalizing  their 
subordination . By questioning  the gender insensitivity  of 
ethics  and  philosophy , feminism  attempts  to reveal 
various  forms  of  subjugation  of  women  operating 
through  laws , institutions , customs , social  theories , and 
cultural values. Feminism aims at coming up with a better 
design  for  society , based  on a thorough  review  and 






The core content of Feminists‘ critique of traditional  or mainstream 
ethics  can be formulated  in the form of the following  charge :
 
that 
because of its inherent gender bias ethics has so far been grounding 
discriminations on gender distinctions or differences. That is to say, 
by  capitalizing
 
sex /gender  differences  ethics  is perpetuating 
discriminatory  practices  in the society . As against  this , Feminists 
have adopted the stance that the only possible way
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 to dispense with the male bias of ethics is to accommodate 
women‘s experiences in it. It is a truism that non-inclusion of the 
variety of women‘s experiences stigmatized traditional ethics. 
Inclusion of the same is, therefore, a necessity. However, it needs to 
be ascertained in this context, that there is a sharp contrast in the 
approaches of mainstream ethics and feminist ethics towards the 
phenomenon of gender differences or gender distinctions. While 
gender distinctions served as the base for both exclusion of 
women‘s issues and sustenance of discriminatory practices in 
traditional ethics, feminist ethics wants to bring necessary 
correction in the same on the ground of inclusion of this difference 
only.  
Question arises—if ethics cannot ignore or sideline the issue of 
gender distinctions or differences, how can it safeguard itself from 
the charge of perpetuating discriminations? While futility of the 
standards of universality and objectivity in gender blind ethics had 
been a matter of Feminists‘ common experience, introduction of 
gender and / or gender differences also equally created enough 
grounds for debates and controversies among various Feminists 
group. Differences of opinions are there as to the question which 
would be suitable goal for Feminist Ethics – Gender Neutrality or 
Gender Equality? Proponents of ‗neutrality‘ thesis, like Susan 
Moller Okin, visualize a gender less society preconditioned by a 
massive restructuring of social institutions. But actualization of this 
symmetrist strategy sounds highly unrealistic at this stage of 
widespread prevalence of gender discriminations and gender 
violence in society. While on other hand, if the asymimetrists‘ 
pledge for equality is treated as worth considering, even then it is 
not risk free. Because an unreflective and simplistic approach 
towards the goal may frustrate the entire strategy. In either of the 
ways the issue of gender difference or distinction gets centrality in 
all the debates. 
2. The Concepts of Gender Neutrality and Gender 
Egalitarianism 
The ideal of ―Gender Neutrality‖ speaks for a common human 
space beyond genders. Gender neutral analysis accordingly 
assumes that there is neutral impact on women and men of all 
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social policy and programmes. Application of the same in the realm 
of ethics leads to the view that moral maxims or principles also do 
have neutral impact upon men and women irrespective of their 
gendered positionalities. Removal of specific male or female 
attributes very often becomes the precondition to this gender 
neutrality where consideration of gendered positions becomes 
redundant. This ideal situation is almost inconceivable in a social 
order where men and women do not yet enjoy equal rights and 
liberties. Obviously, Gender Equality becomes the prime necessity 
of the time. 
Gender egalitarianism implies equality between men and women, 
which entails the concept that all human beings, both men and 
women, are free to develop their personal abilities and make 
choices without the limitations set by stereotypes, rigid gender 
roles and prejudices. Gender equality strives for equal 
consideration of the different behaviours, aspirations and needs of 
women and men that these are to be valued and favoured equally. 
It does not mean that women and men have to become the same; 
but that their rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not 
depend on the fact whether they are born male or female. Gender 
equity stands for fairness of treatment for women and men, 
according to their respective needs. This may include equal 
treatment or treatment that is different but which is considered 
equivalent in terms of rights, benefits, obligations and 
opportunities. That is to say women and men have equal 
conditions for realizing their full human rights and potential to 
contribute to national, political, economic, social and moral 
development and benefit equally from the results. Equality is 
essential for human development and peace. Aspiring for gender 
equality gives recognition to the fact that current social, economic, 
cultural, and political systems are gendered; those of women's 
unequal status is systemic hence, should be eliminated. 
Gender equality requires equal enjoyment by women and men of 
socially valued goods, moral opportunities, resources and rewards. 
However, the emphasis on gender equality does not presume a 
particular model of gender equality for all societies and cultures, 
but reflects a concern that women and men have equal 
opportunities to make choices and work in partnership to achieve 




it. Because of current disparities, equal treatment of women and 
men is insufficient as a strategy for gender equality. Achieving 
gender equality will require changes in institutional practices and 
social relations through which disparities are reinforced and 
sustained. It also requires strengthening of women‘s voices in 
shaping of the societies. Empowerment of women is a necessary 
precondition to it. Equality between women and men should be 
promoted in ways that are appropriate to each in particular 
context. This begins with an understanding of the current status of 
women and men, their relations to each other and the 
interconnections between gender and other factors. Gender 
analysis offers an essential dimension and requisite methods to 
understand and address the socio-cultural reality. Gender analysis 
also makes it realized that there is an urgency to understand the 
social relations between men and women and the interconnection 
of gender with other social relationships, such as those defined by 
race, ethnicity, culture, class, age, disability and/or others status. 
Gender equity is the process of being fair to women and men. To 
ensure fairness, measures must often be available to compensate 
for historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and 
men from otherwise operating on level of parity. Equity leads to 
equality. 
The feminist principle of equality goes at par with the phenomenon 
of inclusion. It reflects the need to address discrimination, prejudice 
and exclusion by including women and other marginalized groups 
in shaping the policies, programs, and practices, services and 
legislation that affect our lives. Inclusion is a process to bring about 
equality. It embraces individuals and groups who have been 
excluded from planning, decision-making and policy development 
within community. Inclusion empowers those, who have been 
traditionally excluded by providing opportunities, resources and 
support needed to participate. Feminist inclusion lens offer a way 
in which we can look at the root causes of long standing problems 
like sexism and other forms of discrimination, and consider new 
ways of thinking to solve these problems. Adoption of egalitarian 
approaches gives recognition to the importance of the two sexes 
(male and female) as complementary biological entities. Respecting 
the dignity and worth of the lives of people (of both genders) 
equally would be the goal of egalitarianism in any form. 




Eighteenth and nineteenth century Feminist philosophers like 
Wollstonecraft‘s and Mill‘s critique of Western Ethics is grounded 
on the fact that in it women‘s interests were never duly weighed 
like men. Hence, they demanded equal status for both men and 
women as regards their rights and privileges of. Of late it is an 
experience of the feminists that demand for identity of treatment 
for both men and women under gender blind laws gives the 
concept of sex / gender equality a formal colour. Formal equality 
does not necessarily result in substantive equality. Many of the 
Feminists‘ works in practical ethics have proved it beyond doubt 
that formally gender blind policies and practices very often are not 
gender neutral in their outcomes. To the contrary they have a 
disproportionately negative impact on women. Women are the 
worst sufferers in every context of scarcity, malnutrition, hunger, 
poverty, social evils, wars, environmental degradation, so on and 
so forth. It has been noticed that gender blind policies instead of 
reducing gender gaps are intensifying them more. In view of these, 
feminists have realized that construing sexual/gender equality in 
purely formal term may be inadequate for reaching substantive 
sexual or gender equality. It is more than an established truth that 
norms of gender situate women differently from men in most social 
contexts across the world. Achieving substantive equality may, 
therefore, necessitate establishing policies and practices that are 
gender-sensitive or gender responsive rather than gender blind. 
  
While gender sensitivity is an urgent requirement in the sphere of 
ethics yet adjusting it with gender distinctions / differences may 
not be an easy task. The decade followed by 1980s had shown a 
significant turn in feminists‘ perception of equality – difference (or 
distinction) issue. Equality agenda constituted the principal goal of 
second-wave feminism since 1960. But, of late some feminists also 
have started developing critique of equality. The pledge of the 
asymmetrists (special rights pleaders) created a tension in the field. 
Because inclusion of ‗differences‘ gradually landed into the plea for 
special rights for women in the matter of pregnancy, maternity or 
women‘s sexuality. This special rights issue was also impacting 
negatively people‘s perception of women‘s participatory roles. Less 




reliability upon women as workers due to their pre-occupations 
with pregnancy was supposed to perpetuate the same cultural 
myth about women‘s incompetence or fragility. Moreover, in some 
corners this apprehension was developed that gender responsive 
interpretations of sexual equality might not only provoke an anti-
feminist backlash, they might even undermine the prospect of long 
term sexual equality. In addition to that gender-responsive 
conceptions of equality were intended to reflect sensibly to 
differences in the circumstances of men and women in general and 
also to differences in the social situations of different women.  
The Feminist agenda for equality must take a note of not only the 
internal differences which are systemic but also individual. It is 
necessary to recognize therefore, if providing child care to mothers 
in paid employment is a necessity, other mother‘s claims to welfare 
support is no less important an issue than the former. The need for 
special consideration in certain situation and in other a general one 
opens up two different areas of special rights and equal rights 
issue. These two kinds of rights, equal and differential (or special) 
work very differently. With regard to an equal right, taking a 
person‘s individual qualities into account may constitute 
discriminations. But with the special rights, they must be taken into 
account, for these rights are based on human differences. The 
special rights perspective was a contribution to Feminist legal 
thinking by Elizabeth Wolgast in 1980. According to her on 
installation of a system of special rights alongside equal rights 
women can best make their distinctive contribution to the culture 
and the society. 
Plenty of Feminists, specially the legal practitioners in America of 
both Symmetrists (equal rights pleaders) and Asymmetrists (special 
rights pleaders) groups have experienced the tension in between 
equality - differences dilemmas. But by now it is clear that Feminist 
Ethics cannot be non-responsive either to gender differences or to 
gender equality. What it needs now is an adequate theoretical 
framework to accommodate both together. That is to say, the 
debates finally end with the necessity of theorizing an ‗equality that 
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acknowledges difference‘.1 The core question is how to recognize 
notions of sexual or gender differences and yet to make an 
argument for equality in ethics. However, by subsuming women 
into general ‗‗human‘‘ diversity one cannot forget the specificity of 
female diversity and women experiences. Keeping this gender 
difference in mind we can claim for gender egalitarianism and also 
argue for a common space for both sexes on the basis of concrete 
universal norms, to be formulated not simply in terms of what is 
the same but in terms of the relevant differences also. As is said by 
Carol, C. Gould, ―On the concrete view, the universal cannot be 
abstracted or conceived apart from their differences but exists only in and 
through them.‘‘2 
The essentialists‘ consideration of sex difference led them to treat 
male and female as fixed natures apart from any particular social 
and historical context. But the notion of concrete universality can 
accommodate all those differences as that which emerged 
historically along with concrete forms of social interaction between 
men and women. So universal norms are constituted by an explicit 
specification of difference. The criterion of concrete universality 
presents a different picture of universal norms on the basis of 
which equality can be constituted on the ground of how individual 
is related to others and taking into account their specific difference. 
This is not to subscribe either to the view of abstract human 
universal or to any consideration of males and females as 
belonging to fundamentally different categories. The theoretical 
framework provided by the poststructuralist feminism also can be 
significant use here in understanding of this situation. A feminist 
poststructuralist approach not only addresses feminist theoretical 
debates about identity, equality and difference, but also opens up 
new opportunities for practitioners in managing diversity and 
                                                          
1      Lise Vogel, Women Questions, Essay for a Materialist Feminism, 
London: Pluto Press, 1995, 111-27. 
2   C. Gould Carol, ed., The Women Question: Philosophy of 
Liberation and the Liberation of Philosophy. In Key concepts in 
Critical Theory of Gender, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997, 
217. 




equality, to reflect on new dimensions of equality. 
Poststructuralism breaks the conceptual hold of long traditions of 
western philosophy that has systematically construed the world in 
terms of muscular universals and feminine specificity. The co-
existence of equality and difference no longer presents any 
structurally impossible choice, as is argued by Scott.3 That is to say, 
sameness is not the sole ground on which equality can be pursued. 
Towards a Gender Egalitarian Ethics  
3. Reconciling Ethics of Care and Justice 
The dissolution of equality-difference or universality-specificity 
dichotomies is implicated in a fresh understanding of care-justice 
dichotomy too. The ethic of care, and especially the way in which it 
relates to theories of justice, has been one of the major streams in 
feminist ethics and political theory over the last decades. When the 
ethics of care started to take shape a few decades ago, care was 
generally seen as a value – or a set of values – opposed to justice. 
Care, presented by some as a feminist value and by others as a 
merely feminine one, is associated with compassion, emotional 
involvement, interest in one‘s particular circumstances and 
responsiveness to concrete needs. The values traditionally 
associated with justice – like impartiality, equality of resources and 
opportunity, fairness and focus on institutional structure – seemed 
to contradict the partiality of care and its emphasis on private 
relationships. Justice requires us to treat everybody according to 
the same standards, to treat friends in the same way as strangers, 
while an ethics of care praises mostly those acts done out of love 
and commitment for those who are near and dear. How could the 
two values be reconciled, then? Feminists pay close attention to 
care as a necessary condition for a just society. They argued that the 
more attention is paid to care as a precondition for social life, more 
it becomes obvious that care is a primary social good, whose 
                                                          
3      Joan W. Scott, ―Deconstructing Equality versus Differences: Or, 
The Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism,‖ in A.C. 
Hermann & A.J. Stewart, ed., Theorizing Feminism, .S.A: 
Westview Press, 1994, 358-371. 
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distribution is a matter of justice. Care is a necessary ingredient for 
the survival of any political community. 
Recent advocates of an ethic of care acknowledge not only that 
some  men think in terms of justice and women in  terms of care, 
but also that most people of each sex  are able to adopt either 
perspective. The ―care orientation‖ focuses upon emotional 
relationships of attachment and networks of concrete relationships, 
connections, loyalties, and circles of concern whereas the ―justice 
orientation‖ focuses upon equality, impartiality, universality, rules, 
and rights. While agents operating from the care orientation view 
human beings as so interdependent as to blur the boundaries 
demarcating them from one another, agents operating from the 
justice orientation are obsessed with the individual‘s autonomy and 
inclined to think of human beings in the most abstract way 
possible.  
An ethic of care and responsibility develops from an individual's 
feeling of interconnectedness with others. It is contextual and arises 
from experience. It is characterized by nurturance and an emphasis 
on responsibilities to others. An ethic of justice, on the other hand, 
is an expression of autonomy. It is formulated in terms of universal, 
abstract principles and is characterized by rationality and an 
emphasis on individual rights. Some describe an ethic of caring as a 
"female" approach to morality and an ethic of rights and justice as a 
"male" approach. There are grounds which justify that the ethic of 
justice and the ethic of care be used complementary to each other 
for effective ethical decision making. It seems that the basic 
orientations of each conception are fundamentally different: the 
ethic of justice requires separation, while the ethic of care requires 
attachment. Separation is needed for the development and exercise 
of impartiality which, in turn, enables one to adjudicate moral 
conflict fairly. Attachment, on the other hand, is necessary for care, 
for care is based on empathy, and empathy is the recognition of 
interconnectedness. In other words, the ethic of care is founded 
upon reversibility. Without the capacity of reversibility it would be 
impossible to care. As discussed above, the ethic of justice also 
entails reversibility. 
  




Taking a clue from the popular view of care vs. justice orientations 
it may be argued so: if women care ―better‖ than men, it may be 
epistemically, ethically and politically imprudent to dissociate 
women from or associate men with the virtue of care. Linking 
women and caring promoted the view that because women care, 
they should do so even at the cost of their own well-being. Whereas 
Gilligan has clearly made it a point to show how care, if used as a 
psychological law in a patriarchal social order, leads to serious 
subordination of women. Patriarchy reconciles the virtue of 
abnegation and care in women‘s morality satisfactorily. To the 
contrary consideration of care as a universal moral injunction is the 
demand of the ethic of care, which is sensitive to the gendered 
positioning as well. Gilligan‘s work plays a significant role here in 
showing how ethic of care dispenses with the limitations of 
psychology of care. However an unreflective understanding of care 
and justice perspectives may lead one to subscribe to the view that 
there can hardly be any human experience as much but only ‗male 
experience‘ and ‗female experience‘. And also that highlighting the 
differences between men‘s and women‘s situations in life, both 
biologically and socially, makes one incapable of being reflective of 
universal human nature. 
Some questions still remain: to what extent is either of these moral 
'voices' (care and justice) related to gender? Can the ethic of care 
based on relatedness and responsiveness to others be considered a 
truly feminist ethic? What if we add in a principle or principles of 
feminism, the perspective of care? Can it be a principle of ethical 
deliberation, even accepting the naturalistic perspective that 
challenges all traditional values (justice, autonomy) as universal in 
character?  Even if we accept such principles as justice as an ethical 
ideal and if it can be a principle, can it be triumphing principle, one 
that supersede other principles in a given context? If we treat moral 
orientations of justice and care as dichotomous then how can we 
claim for universal valid ethics for both sexes? Or no antagonism 
needs to be presumed between the two? Can both males and 
females do moral reasoning based on both justice and care? Can we 
ever come up with a design of justice – care blending and talk 
about multiplicity of moral perspectives among women as well as 
men? Should we subscribe to the view that gender distinctions may 
well be significantly spoken of and the context would still be 
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moral? How can the ethic of justice and the ethic of care be used 
complementary to each other in ethical decision making?  Liberal 
justice theorists tend to relegate care to the personal sphere and 
thereby conceptualize it as a form of self-interested action. Care 
theorists, like Gilligan, have recognized that the language of care 
tends to be ignored by justice theorists. But how far is it correct to 
identify justice and care as two genderized moralities?  
Rawls' arguments in A Theory of Justice, presuppose care. Liberal 
justice theory should incorporate its own dependence on the 'ethic 
of care' into its theory, and work toward a conception of justice and 
care as reciprocal and interdependent. So there is a third way to 
view justice and care as complementary dimensions of morality. 
This complimentarity is, in turn, based upon an enlarged sense of 
self-identification from the personal to the ontological to the 
ecological. It may be proposed that this sequence of enlarged 
identification constitutes the development of morality as an 
integration of justice and care. On the highest level of abstraction 
the ethic of justice as fairness maintains that there exists a universal 
obligation to humanity. This obligation is generally conceived in 
terms of a universal commitment of respect for the inherent dignity 
of all persons. The ethic of care, on the other hand, maintains that 
moral obligation is grounded in the particulars of the moral 
context. In this sense the ethic of care grounds morality in an ethic 
of association. The ethic of association maintains that moral 
responsibility is based on particular human relationships. Ethical 
obligation emerges out of relationship, and it is care, from the 
feminist perspective, that is the central emergent property of ethical 
association. However, while perceiving the associative quality of 
morality as essential, the ethic of care is also based upon a universal 
commitment to our shared humanity. Gilligan herself concludes 
that the essential motivation of an ethic of care is ‗‗that everyone will 
be responded to and included, that no one will be left alone or hurt.‖4 
These statements suggest that a commitment to our shared 
humanity in a universal sense, rather than one that is founded 
upon particular and immediate association is as basic to the ethic of 
                                                          
4        C. Gilligan, cited in Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political 
Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, 271. 




care as it is to an ethic of justice. The web of relations extends 
beyond immediate association to include an ontological 
interdependence. 
  
Responsibility is essentially a function of one's capacity to respond 
to others, whether in terms of their needs (care) or in terms of 
respect (fairness).5 Being responsive is the ontological foundation of 
moral obligation and, hence, moral development. And, 
responsiveness is a function of identification. Responsiveness 
occurs within a relational field. It requires and is constituted by 
relationship. Responsible relationship implies a mutually 
permissive interaction that can only occur if there is resonance 
between the individuals who are in relationship. Resonance, in 
turn, occurs on the basis of identification. Therefore, if there is no 
identification, there will be no response and, hence, neither care nor 
fairness. As one's identification expands or contracts, one's capacity 
to respond and, thus, to act morally, expands or contracts. This is 
the essence of reversibility as a moral foundation, and it applies to 
both care and justice. 
  
Care entails the embracing of interconnectedness. The expansion of 
identification is one of unification with the other -- recognizing the 
web of relationships that literally connect our identities. Whereas 
the expansion of identification entailed in justice does not imply 
interconnection per se, but it is an identification that recognizes the 
sameness of interpersonal boundaries that define individuality 
within a relational field. This identification of the boundaries of 
others as identical to the boundaries that define our own 
individuality is the basis of respect. This kind of identification is 
recognition of the fact that, just as one does not want one‘s private 
boundaries violated, neither do others. This accounts for justice as 
respect. This notion of responsibility is essentially negative in that it 
requires a response that prohibits interference (the essence of 
respect for boundaries), whereas the ethic of care entails a positive 
                                                          
5      Erich Fromm, Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of 
Ethics. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947, 234. 
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conception of responsibility in that it requires a response to help, to 
provide in order to satisfy a need. Eco-philosophies, such as Deep 
Ecology, Social Ecology and Eco-feminism, are all possible 
contenders for such a philosophy in that they clearly articulate such 
concepts as interrelatedness, oneness, wholeness, completeness and 
inter-connectedness of human beings with everything around them. 
4. Conclusion  
The complementarity between justice and care is expressed in the 
ecosophical conception of morality put forth by Arne Naess.6 The 
justice and care orientations of Kohlberg and Gilligan have 
important features in common which relate directly to Naess's 
ecosophy. Morality is not conceived as an abstract body of rules, 
but as a state of being. Morality here is not a body of principles to 
be obeyed, but a way of being in the world, in relation to other 
human beings as well as nature. From an ecosophical perspective, 
we exist in a web of relations that extends to nature itself. Naess's 
view is consistent with the ethic of care, even extending the sphere 
of association to include not only the web of human relations, but 
the ecological web. However, we do not exist with complete 
autonomy: we are fundamentally related and simultaneously 
individuated. Just as our interrelatedness requires care, our 
individuated status requires respect. Naess states it this way: "In the 
thinking of the field ecologist there is respect for an extreme diversity of 
beings capable of living together in an intricate web of relations.‖7 
  
When we care for and respect another being or even the earth, we 
are engaged in an act of friendship.8 Friendship is a relationship of 
love which allows the other person to be authentic. In facilitating 
                                                          
6    Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Life style, trans. & ed., 
David Rothenberg, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1989, 132 
7     Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Life style, 257. 
8     Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, Boston: Shambala 
Press, 1990, 217. 




the authenticity of the other, we are simultaneously caring for and 
respecting them, acknowledging and nurturing our 
interdependence while simultaneously affirming our individual 
uniqueness. Friendship, in this sense, is the organizing catalyst for 
the expansion of self and the proportional expansion of our moral 
capacity for care and fairness. The growth of friendship generally 
proceeds in terms of personal interaction and identification. We 
become friends and treat others with care and respect those who 
we have come to know and appreciate personally. However, 
friendship and, thus, care and respect can proceed in terms of 
ontological and even ecological identification.9 We can befriend 
nature and the earth by expanding our sense of self through a 
recognition of ecological interdependence. Here our identification 
is ecological and, in turn, our moral sensibility enlarges to include 
the natural environment. 
 
                                                          
9    Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, Ch. 8. 
